Investigation: Priority of team building with Afghans made Taylor vulnerable on tragic outing
Maj. Brent Taylor on a hike with a group of fellow American and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan in 2018. The soldiers took a hike on most Fridays.
The hard copy of Maj. Brent Taylor's investigation report that explains the events that led to his death. Maj. Taylor was shot and killed by an Afghan solider on Nov. 3, 2018, in Afghanistan.
A weekly hike that Maj. Brent Taylor pioneered to build teamwork, trust and physical fitness with the Afghan commandos he trained ended up providing an easy setting for his assassin, an investigation concluded.
An Army investigation into the 39-year-old North Ogden mayor’s assassination outlined how the U.S. adviser’s efforts were exploited by his assassin before and during the hike, called a “ruck march.”
Photo supplied
Maj. Brent Taylor is pictured on the left in this video still during a ruck march with Afghan soldiers in 2018. The march was a recreational activity that took place most Saturdays. Maj. Brent Taylor was shot and killed by an Afghan soldier on one of these marches on Nov. 3, 2018. “This is what it would have looked like the day he died,” says his wife, Jennie Taylor.
On Nov. 2, 2018, the night before his death, Taylor sent word that he would need his interpreter the next morning. The ruck marches were back, following a hiatus of a few weeks that ironically was due to security concerns.
In October, an Afghan general had been killed in an insider attack in Kandahar, and Afghan and U.S. Army leaders were hearing that some Afghans falsely blamed Americans for the death.
Supplied
Maj. Brent Taylor, left, and Afghan solider Lieutenant Kefayatullah in Afghanistan in 2018. Taylor posted this picture on Facebook on Oct. 28, 2018, with a caption that read, “My Friend Lieutenant Kefayatullah, who was killed fighting the Taliban the day before voting began. Brave Afghans are fighting hard for their country.” This was Maj. Taylor’s last post before he was killed on Nov. 3, 2018.
That led the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Austin Scott Miller, to order a temporary stand-down of American adviser activities, such as Taylor’s ruck marches. The idea was to give Afghan commanders time to convince their troops the rumor was false.
Sgt. Asfar Khan, a member of the approximately 230-man Ktah Khas Afghanistan battalion, or KKA, did not receive those assurances, did not believe them, or simply wanted to kill the “infidel” major from Utah anyway.
“This event presented the first opportunity for Khan’s access to Major Taylor” since Miller approved resumption of adviser missions, the report said.
At 8:45 a.m., Taylor, his Afghan interpreter and U.S. Army Private Jessie Brown — his assigned “Guardian Angel” security escort that day — assembled with the KKA battalion for the approximately 5-mile march.
Photo supplied
Maj. Brent Taylor is seen in the center on a ruck march in Afghanistan in 2018. The event took place most Saturdays with Afghan soldiers. Taylor was killed on a ruck march like this one on Nov. 3, 2018.
ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST
In the Army investigation report, obtained by the Standard-Examiner with a Freedom of Information Act request, the lead investigator explained Taylor’s rationale for the “rucks.”
The marches were “important advising missions,” the investigator said. Taylor had convinced KKA leaders the previous March to begin the weekly hikes.
“However, his weekly participation became predictable and Khan likely used that predictability to plan and execute the attack,” the report said. “Major Taylor specifically mentioned they relied on ‘trust’ for their security when advising.”
Commanders at Camp Scorpion, where Taylor was based, also set the tone.
“There was a clear atmosphere of mutual trust and respect,” the investigation said. “This played an important role that provided a false sense of security to the Camp Scorpion advisers, who I found did not put enough emphasis into assessing the security risks and posture for each engagement.”
Further, the camp considered the ruck marches an especially low-risk activity, the report said.
Taylor routinely brought one Guardian Angel unit soldier on each march, the report said, adding that the major “preferred to take junior soldiers as a professional development opportunity.”
“It was important to Major Taylor to set a good example to the KKA by participating,” the investigator said in describing the beginning of the march. “He wore his body armor and ruck but not a helmet.”
Photo supplied
Maj. Brent Taylor, center, on a hike with a group of fellow American and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan in 2018. The soldiers took a hike on most Fridays.
AMMUNITION OBTAINED
Just before the march began, an opportunity to thwart Khan was missed.
For a training hike, Afghan commanders were expected to inspect their troops to retrieve any extra ammunition they might have. The report said only a random handful of KKA commandos were supposed to have ammo that morning for force protection purposes, and Khan was not one of them.
The investigation said Khan had been able to obtain three or more rounds of M4 rifle ammunition, and whatever inspection was conducted, he was not affected.
Over the first several miles of the hike, Khan stalked his way toward the front and waited for his opportunity to attack.
As Taylor and Brown turned left for the final stretch back to Camp Scorpion, Khan, about 10 feet behind, fired two to three shots, hitting Taylor in the back of the head and grazing Brown’s back.
“Major Taylor likely was killed instantly, based on the trajectory of the bullet and his lack of responsiveness immediately following the attack,” the report said.
The 19-year-old Brown told investigators Taylor had been playing music on his cell phone for the lead group of soldiers to listen to as they marched.
The private said he was marching on Taylor’s left, about an arm’s length away, when he heard gunshots.
He fell to one knee and turned to the right, “and instinctively fired two rounds in the direction of the shot.”
Brown said he did not see who fired, and he at first did not realize he had been shot. He thought Taylor had taken cover, but he soon found the major was unresponsive.
He remembered looking at his watch. It was 9:55 a.m.
Brown, who later received a Purple Heart medal, yelled for a medic, performed CPR and coordinated efforts to have Taylor evacuated.
Taylor’s interpreter was “screaming and crying,” according to the report, and Brown helped calm him.
The interpreter later told an investigator, “Major Taylor was great and educated, well-behaved, friendly and a diligent man. I loved him and I will remember him all my life. Major Taylor was an inspirational man.”
THE SHOOTER RUNS
Behind the two Americans and the interpreter, most KKA commandos dropped to the ground upon hearing the shots.
What happened next was pieced together by interviews with a handful of Afghan soldiers, the investigator said. Many others wouldn’t talk.
“I believe there is a barrier preventing those who saw the event from coming forward for fear of retaliation from their peers,” the investigator wrote.
According to the available accounts, a KKA commando grabbed Khan after the shooting, causing the attacker to drop his rifle.
Khan began running south, away from the victims and the Afghan troops.
“At the direction of KKA leaders, approximately 8 to 10 KKA commandos opened fire on Khan as he fled,” the report said.
They fired about 20 rounds, hitting Khan twice. He was struck in the leg and torso and fell face down. Those interviewed gave conflicting estimates of the distance to Khan, from 150 feet to 275 yards.
Commandos approached Khan, led by a captain.
The captain “shot him in the back of the head at close range,” the report said. “He claimed he thought the shooter was a hostile actor in an ANA (Afghan National Army) uniform who might attempt to detonate an explosive as the KKA closed on him.”
The officer “claimed he did not realize it was one of his soldiers until the other soldiers rolled Khan over.”
The captain, who was Khan’s superior, said he thought the attacker was a “terrorist or an Al-Qaeda person.” He said he thought the shooter “was probably hiding somewhere and got into our crowd and shot at us.”
After he realized the dead assassin was his sergeant, the captain said he thought, “How did this wretch get the ammunition?”
In his report findings, the investigator said the captain’s shooting of Khan was highly questionable.
During his interview with the Army investigator, the captain also praised Taylor.
“This country is peaceful and he is here to help us,” the interview transcript said. “Major Taylor himself was a good person with excellent demeanor. He would come as our relative and give us a hug instead of shaking hands. He had a very good relationship with us.”
TAYLOR, KILLER PUT IN TRUCK BED
As Brown and others were tending to Taylor, KKA troops flagged down a civilian in a pickup truck. They loaded Khan’s body in the bed.
They drove toward Taylor. “Not knowing the deceased Khan was in the vehicle,” those tending to Taylor put him in the truck bed next to Khan’s body.
They drove Taylor back to Camp Scorpion, and at 10:47 a.m. he arrived by helicopter at Craig Joint Theater Hospital at Bagram Airfield. A trauma surgeon pronounced him dead at 10:54 a.m.
The investigator criticized Camp Scorpion’s preparedness against insider threats for various reasons, including warnings in a Sept. 5, 2018, Afghan theater counterintelligence vulnerability assessment.
That study “concluded Camp Scorpion had a critical insider threat, as 74% of the population (KKA commandos) that required to be screened had not been completed.”
In addition to a co-conspirator, who did not go on the ruck march, Khan had tried to recruit a third commando to kill Americans, the investigation said. That commando refused, but did not report the incident to his superiors.
Brown’s conduct was found to be exemplary. But the investigative officer criticized the Guardian Angels unit for alleged insufficient training and planning for assignments.
“Although there had never before been an insider attack in the history of the KKA, there were enough threat indicators to take additional mitigating measures with their force protection policies,” the report said.
“While it is difficult to determine exactly how many (Guardian Angels) would have been appropriate to defeat the threat imposed by Khan, there was no deliberate analysis or planning process that determined one (Guardian Angel) was appropriate for 229 KKA members conducting the ruck march.”
